, its basic holding that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution is certainly bedrock. However, given the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," 3 which suggests that judicial review is in tension with democratic rule, the Court's authority to displace majority decisions found in state and federal law becomes problematic. The authority can be claimed as emanating from the original social compact, ratified by a super-majoritarian popular consent and intended to continue in time unless and until amended. However, claims of judicial tyranny can be heard by the opponents of virtually every exercise of judicial review. In theory, the closer the decision is to the original deal, the greater its legitimacy. But what was that dealwas it to keep judicial review closely tied to the specific language and meanings of the founding document; or was it to vest the Court with a degree of flexibility to fashion a body of law that assured that the meaning of fundamental rights would develop and flourish in an ever changing world? The Court's history has seen frequent movement between these two poles.
Over the years a wide variety of interpretative theories or modes have been developed by the Court or by individual justices. There is no definitive list of these modes and every commentator has his or her own take on the matter 4 . The goal of this piece is to introduce the most commonly used modes 5 . These modes may be viewed as tools of the trade of Constitutional 1 *Professor of Law, Suffolk University School of Law. The author wishes to express his thanks to Professor Steven Callahan for his thoughtful critiques of this article. and debating the text. They intended that their product would continue in time and control the future, thus expressing, in a sense, a skepticism about future generations. 9 Certainly the text is the appropriate beginning and end of the discussion of many easy cases. Should President Clinton have suggested that he would like to run for a third term, the response is clear: the Twentysecond Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice,..." 10 The questions about the use of text usually involve its limits and its methodology. The limits arrive quickly upon the back of the non-obvious case, such as whether the Commerce Clause of Article I section 8 authorizes Congress to enact grain acreage limitations. The most absolute member of the court on these questions was Justice Black who seemed to feel that any further inquiry into intent, history or pragmatics, involved the judge in an exercise that was too vague and uncertain to be acceptable for a judge whose function was interpretation rather than creation.
11 Literary critics, however, remind us that the meaning of text must be created instead of discovered. ) "all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even obliterated."See discussion infra. 13 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The question, of course, was whether Congress had the power to create the Bank of the United States. Congress had the power to regulate commerce and to coin money, but not the power to create a bank. Marshall ingeniously read the necessary and proper clause to allow Congress broad discretion to decide how to exercise these powers: "It is true, that this is the sense in which the word "necessary" is always used? Does it always import an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that one thing, to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist without that other? *** To employ the means necessary to an end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable. *** The word "necessary" *** has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison; and is often connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed, by these several phrases. This comment on the word is well illustrated, by the passage cited at the bar, from the 10 th section of the 1 st article of the constitution. It is, we think, impossible to compare the sentence which prohibits a State from laying "imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws," that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limits, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the question which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, The sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects is plenary as to those objects... as absolutely as it would be in a single government..."
II. Original Understanding
The drafting of the Constitution and each of the amendments involved extensive deliberative processes. Innumerable drafts were written, speeches were given, reports were developed. Contemporaneously newspapers, journals and commentators added their views. After passage by the Convention, the proposals then went to the legislatures of the states for further debate and deliberation. The original understanding refers to the meaning that was understood at the time of enactment. It is discovered by a process of historical research into sources contemporary to the enactment. 15 The proponents of this mode of interpretation claim that any freer ranging interpretive posture on the part of the Court involves an illegitimate assumption of power and is thereby unjustified.
The difficulties with this method are numerous and difficult. 16 The notion of intent or understanding makes sense when directed at an individual; However it is difficult to attribute these terms to a large group of legislators who deliberate and vote at different times, many for with that which authorizes Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers of the general government, without feeling a conviction that the convention understood itself to change materially the meaning of the word "necessary," by prefixing the word "absolutely." This word, then, like others, is used in various senses; and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into view." 14 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) Here Marshall was confronted with the question of whether Congress had the power to issue a license that allowed the holder to provide a ferry service across New York harbor: " The subject to which the power is next applied, is to commerce "among the several states." The word "among" means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior. It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other states. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary...
We are now arrived at the inquiry -What is this power? , Justice Souter's concurrence quotes four different earlier renditions of the religion clauses in support of his claim that the Clause was not merely a prohibition against the preference of one religion over another. Justice Scalia, in dissent, suggested that the Church of England was the established church in the colony of Virginia and quoted George Washington's prayer in his first inaugural address as evidence of the national commitment to religion.
III.. Structural
The Constitution establishes and recognizes power-sharing on vertical and horizontal planes. Vertically, it creates a national government, while leaving large amounts of residual power in the states, a relationship of federalism. Horizontally, the federal power is distributed among the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches, mirroring a similar distribution at the state level, separation of powers. The Court as final expositor of the Constitution plays a major role in drawing these two sets of boundaries. It does so explicitly when a case presents a question which presents a power distribution question.
The Court must often decide whether to restrain itself from imposing a rule which might displace an exercise of power by a branch or level more appropriate to the exercise. In these situations, the court is in the somewhat strange position of having to police itself with respect to 17 its own exercise of authority. Professor Thayer considered the power of judicial review in a democracy to be a "remarkable practice" to be exercised with the greatest restraint. An act of a legislature should be invalidated only when it made a mistake "a very clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question."
20 Professor Bickel also advocated restraint through the exercise of the passive virtues by which the Court may decide not to decide a matter because of fears about the popular acceptance of the Court's judgment or because as a practical matter the time for decision is not opportune, 21 or the lack of an appropriate case or controversy under Article III, namely if the plaintiffs lack standing, 22 or if the controversy is moot 23 or unripe. 24 The Political Question doctrine also affords the Court with an opportunity to avoid decision of difficult cases.
25
The concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Ashwander 26 counsels that "it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is possible by which the question may be avoided" at p 348 and that the constitutional question will be avoided if there is "present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. 
IV. Doctrine
The federal judiciary established in Article III took its original shape and form from its English predecessors 43 . That common law tradition dictated establishing and following precedent. When confronted with a novel fact situation the common law court is concerned about the past and the future: the past, because of a felt obligation to square its holdings with a received body of case-law; the future, because the court's decision will stand as precedent in future cases. The system has the virtue of deciding only the narrow case and to that extent is provisional, experimental, open to feed-back and incremental.
44 Doctrine takes shape step by step over time and is the product of the work of many minds. 45 Courts have an obligation to be custodians of the law and to assure that the law is coherent, clear and consistent, 46 which in turn advances social stability and continuity. 47 Each decision should rest upon reasons "that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result..." 48 Of course a system of precedent also allows for narrowing and overruling of precedent. 49 The history of American Constitutional law has many famous examples of a willingness or a refusal to overrule precedent. The Court's blockage of Roosevelt's New Deal is well-known to even the casual student of American history, as is Roosevelt's threat to pack the Court. Justice Robert's "switch in time that saved nine" 50 refers to a change of heart by one 49 In the common law tradition, the judge has the ability to make law. This fact lends prestige to the office of judge, which is to be distinguished from the judge in the civil law tradition, where the judge is seen only as a functionary whose function is interpreting the code, which is viewed as an uncomplicated, mechanical process. Doctrinal law is what the lawyer or scholar reaches for almost by instinct when asked a novel question of Constitutional (or, indeed, any) law. Recent Constitutional precedent from the Supreme Court is bedrock. If the questioner is inquiring into the constitutionality of, for instance a university affirmative action plan to assist minority admissions, the lawyer asks when the Court last addressed the affirmative action issue and then upon finding Adarand, asks how the case applies to the question asked. A similar methodology will be followed by any lower court, state or federal. Most of the other originalist modes described are engaged in at the Supreme Court level only. The rest of us plebians are relegated to parsing the pearls of wisdom that descend upon us from the Supreme Court.
B. THE EXTRINSIC MODES
Two modes of interpretation that have had sufficient influence to be included herein are solicitude for the unfortunate and natural law. Their legitimacy as sources is more controversial by virtue of their absence from the text. Others would argue that the Framers clearly drew on these strains of thought in their drafting. Of course many other modes could compete here for attention including libertarianism and economics. These two are chosen because their long term influence on the current body of Constitutional doctrine remains strong. 51 56 Her characteristically lengthy and pretentious opinion begins with, "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." She then laboriously reviews the history of stare decisis in the Court including the cases mentioned in the text. After completing that history she disregards the trimester system of Roe and substitutes her own "undue burden test." 57 Indeed, it was this lack of precedent that cause such consternation over the Court's intrusion into the 2000 presidential election controversy in Bush v. Gore 121 S.Ct. 525 (2000) V. Solicitude for the Unfortunate For de Tocqueville, 58 the American sense of equality was "ardent, insatiable, incessant [and] invincible.". He attributed it as arising from the equality of conditions that the settlers found upon arriving in this new land. He also felt that equality was a natural tendency in a democratic state where the franchise is widely shared. In addition, in a common law system each litigant before a court is treated equally and the system of precedent dictates that similar cases generate similar results regardless of the identity of the parties. Finally, Christian doctrine taught that all human beings are children of God and that even the most degenerate are loved by God and could achieve salvation through repentance. A very different state of affairs existed in the colonists' home-lands, where an aristocracy continued to demand the privileges they commanded in feudal days and the animosity to the English King during the period leading to the Revolution sprang from these feelings.
Surely, the Constitution ratified the status quo existence of slavery; but just as surely the accommodation was not comfortable and a sizable group of abolitionists constantly raised the slave issue. The slavery controversy, the Civil War, and the post Civil War amendments were logical results of this sense of equality. Indeed, the Bill of Rights protections of speech, religion and home, and against governmental overreaching though the criminal process insures equal treatment before the law.
The twentieth century has witnessed political movements in favor of women's suffrage, civil rights, women's rights, and more recently in favor the disabled, homosexual, and the immigrant. Indeed the continuous immigration guarantees a new group reminding the country about its commitment to equality.
The post-New Deal Court has been especially responsive to claims of harm visited by overreaching majorities 59 . Beginning with the Carolene Products footnote 60 , the Court has shown a special solicitude for the claims of minorities. 61 Certainly the Warren Court embraced equality principle and applied it expansively. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to protect the poor, 62 presented the Court with an early challenge to the 1917 Espionage Act by five avowed "rebels, revolutionaries, anarchists", whom Holmes in dissent characterized as "unknown" men with a "silly" leaflet. The First Amendment was also invoked to protect Viet Nam protesters, The Preamble to the Constitution states the premises upon which the Framers relied, namely that they were attempting "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty" 92 The Framers were well-schooled in the writings of John Locke. The drafting of the Constitution had much in common with Locke's social compact which, according to Locke, was preceded by a state of nature, where human beings lived in "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit... without asking leave. 93 Further many of the early settlers were deeply religious Christians who were influenced by the thinking Aristotle, Aquinas 94 and Luther, whose thought began with God's love for every individual. By using one's reason and thinking about human nature, one can develop certain conclusions about individual freedom, dignity and equality. 95 These create certain minima that governments cannot transgress. 96 Rights, privileges and immunities become limitations on governmental power. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments make explicit the notion that the people have not ceded all power to the government that they were establishing. The most cited catalogue of these rights is in Corfield v. Coryell 97 92 See also Declaration of Independence: invoking the "laws of nature and nature's God" the following truths are "self-evident": "that all men are created equal; that they are created by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit mof happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their opwer form the consent of the governed..." 94 Aquinas stated that "every law framed by man bears the character of a law exactly to the extent to which it is derived from the law of nature." quoted in Russell, A History of Western Philosophy New York, A Touchstone Book, 1945, p.623. 96 The Bill of Rights itself protects natural law rights including speech, religion, conscience, home and person, property, self protection, subject only to constraints that are general and widely publicized.
97 "Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; . . . and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions that are paid by the other citizens of the state; . . . the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and may others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities".
Explicit acceptance of natural law by the Court was more common in early years. In Calder v. Bull 98 , Justice Chase rejected the "omnipotence" of legislative authority, citing the "purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact." In Murray's Lessee, 99 The claim that natural law has an appropriate place in the lexicon of interpretation methodologies is highly contentious, primarily because it may be a primary vehicle by which judges can inject their personal predilections into the law. Natural Law has never recovered from the scathing attack it received form Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Adamson 104 , calling it an "incongruous excrescence." It continues to be disfavored by the Court and the academy, but continues to be the best explanation for privacy 105 , procedural due process 106 and school desegregation.
VII. SUPER-RATIONALISM
Super-rationalism is a mode of judicial review where the Court retraces the legislative process 108 that led to the enactment of the statute under review. The state or local government whose decision is under review assumedly perceived a problem: too many automobile accidents 109 , the high cost of pensions, or too many unqualified makers of replacement eyeglasses. The alleviation of the problem is the legislative goal or purpose. 110 Upon further study, the legislative body typically finds a variety of possible solutions involving different winners and losers. Some solutions may require high expenditures; some may require the discharge of government workers; some may conflict with other important goals. Many of the above-discussed difficulties of finding the intent of the Framers apply here as well; this inquiry investigates the intent of a legislative body with respect to a particular enactment.
111 Again, it often leads to an uncertain factual inquiry using widely varied evidence including expert opinion, legislative findings, and journalism.
Once the legislative purpose has been determined super-rationalism may go in either of two directions; balancing or means-ends review.
112 In means-ends review, the Court attempts to assess the relationship between the means and the ends to discover if the degree of proximity 108 Super-rationalism also reviews administrative rulings and decisions and individual decisions, mostly decided by state and local administrators. E.g.: Washington v. Davis (whether the choice a particular examination as a prerequisite for entry into the police department was justified); County of Sacramento v. Lewis 523 U. S. 833 (1998) (reasonableness of a high speed police chase) 109 However, even at this early stage, uncertainty creeps into the process. First, the statement of the problems will obviously vary: too many automobile accidents may have unnumerable restatements: too many cars; too little safely inspection of cars, too few (or too many ) traffic controls; too much alcohol etc. 110 Here again uncertainty: The vote for any particular solution is going to be the aggregation of the widest varieties of reasons including party affiliation, past debts, lobbyists, constituencies etc. Super-rationalism always seems to assume a unified cleanly-defined, legislative intent. meets the required test. In balancing, the interests vindicated by the enactment (increased traffic safety) is balanced against the interest of the opponent of the measure (unencumbered passage).
Lastly, the Court often establishes a standard for judging the appropriateness of a legislature's choice of means. This judgment may be used independently, such as the requirement that limitations on speech in a public forum be reasonable, or in combination with other tests, such as the requirement that the use of race in an affirmative action plan be narrowly tailored, as well as justified by a compelling governmental interest.
A. MEANS-ENDS REVIEW
This method, common in First and Fourteenth Amendment cases, typically has two steps:(1) a discovery, a definition, and an analysis of the governmental purpose 113 (2) an assessment of whether the purpose sought in step one and the means used are sufficiently closely related to meet a test which varies in its strictness with the Constitutional principle invoked. Often the inquiry stops at the first step because the Court simply finds the legislative goal to wanting.
114 Equal protection imposes a strictness level review, utilizing one of three standards: rational, 115 .important or compelling. Rational basis equal protection adds a third step, assessing the overall reasonableness of the means. 115 The Court's formulation of the test varies considerably from case to case: instance in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia 253 U.S. 412 (1920) the court required that every classification be "reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest upon some ground of difference having a far and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike;" in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co 220 U. S. 61 (1911), the opponent of a classification bore the burden of showing it to be "essentially arbitrary." Compare F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (exempting cable television systems form local franchising requirements where a satellite dish serves a building or buildings that are commonly owned or managed) the Court invoked judicial restraint to limit judicial intervention "no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." The opponent of a classification must "negate every conceivable basis that might support it." The absence of a legislative basis for a classification has "no significance." 116 Purpose inquiry is also in the search for invidious discriminatory motive. For instance, under equal protection, for an invidious discrimination to be so labeled it must have been motivated by a desire to treat the disfavored group differentially. See Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (differential impact insufficient to invalidate the use of a particular test as a precondition to entry into the police department.); Geduldig v. Aiello 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy benefits form state disability insurance policy was not anti-female). Purpose to favor in-state i. Rationality The Court's most deferential posture asks whether the state's interest is rational, placing the burden is upon the opponent of the state to prove irrationality. Examples of this level of review include the old equal protection cases, usually challenging an economic regulation. In Dukes 117 , the Court found rational the interest of New Orleans in "enhancing the vital role of the French Quarter's tourist-orientated charm." In Murgia 118 , the Court found rational the state interest in "assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed officers." In Beazer, 119 the Court found rational the fear of drug use on the job. In Fritz 120 , the Court accepted the avoidance of wholesale receipt of double pension benefits and thus cost cutting as rational. Due Process reviews economic legislation, using the same test. 121 The states interest in police readiness, a drug-free work force or fiscal responsibility certainly meet the test of rationality.
ii. Strict Scrutiny The strictest is the compelling governmental interest standard. It is used in the racial 122 , ethnic 123 and other 124 discrimination cases and a hodge-podge of other "fundamental interest"
residents is relevant to a commerce clause challenge. Kassel v. Consolidate Freighrways Corp. (governor's statement in defense of the bill under review, prohibiting double trailers, indicated a parochial purpose at the expense of out-of-staters); legislation that is directed at a particular religion is invalid under the Free Exercise Clause. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (animal sacrifice) equal protection cases, 125 where, for reasons of Constitutional interpretation, the Court's protective instincts are so high that the Court approaches the state's interference with a high degree of skepticism. The majority in Roe v. Wade 126 imposed the standard on state interference with the fundamental due process right to an abortion, but then seems to have abandoned the test in favor of a "significant obstacle" 127 or "undue burden." 128 The Court occasionally uses the language of strict scrutiny in facial discrimination cases under the dormant commerce clause. 129 Finally, the Court has rejected earlier cases that held that strict scrutiny was appropriate for Free Exercise cases. 130 States almost never can satisfy the burdens of strict scrutiny.
131
iii. Middle-level Scrutiny A newer middle level scrutiny appears to have currency in the gender cases. This level asks whether a statutory classification "serves important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." 132 In the VMI case 133 , the Court felt that the state's interest in harsh educational methods in military school did not meet the test, while preventing teenage pregnancy 134 , flexibility in dispatching military personnel 135 , and the difficulties in distinguishing between real and fraudulent non-marital fathers did 136 . This is the prevailing test in illegitimacy discrimination cases. 137 A similar test judges governmental restrictions on non-verbal communication 138 and commercial speech. 139 The Establishment Clause requires state to religious schools to have a "secular legislative purpose."
140
The Takings clause requires that exactions be for "legitimate state interests."
141 The Court found a city's desire to zone out adult theaters to be "substantial."
142 Under the privileges and immunities Clause, the reason for discriminating against out-of-staters must be "substantial".
133 United States v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (challenge to all-male military school.) The reasoning of this case, like so many others is confusing. The State offers as a justification for military-style colleges the production of "citizen-soldiers."Logic would seem to label the use of "adversatives" (disrespect and harassment) as a means. The exclusion of women would be examined to judge the importance of the exclusion of women to the successful use of that means. The Court however, discusses independent justifications for the exclusion of women: diversity and the preservation of the use of adversatives. With respect to the first the Court seems to find it justifiable in theory, but unproved in the facts of this case. With respect to the second, the Court seems to fail to closely examine whether the state interest in prohibiting the physical violence involved in adversatives to occur between the sexes. Instead it falls back upon the rhetoric of discrimination , citing the need for female citizen-soldiers as well as male. This admixture of the two parts of rationality review is common. Next, the Court often proceeds to a judgment about the means ends fit. The equal protection cases have three levels of means scrutiny corresponding to ends scrutiny: strict scrutiny requires the means to be "necessary" 143 to achieve the legislative goals; middle level requires the means to be "substantially related;" 144 rationality review requires opponents to establish the negative: means must be "without any rational basis," 145 or, perhaps, "irrelevant" to the state's purpose. 146 For instance in Hodgson v. Minnasota 147 the reviewed a statute that required a minor female to obtain the consent of both parents as a precondition to obtaining an abortion. The court found the State's interest in assuring that the minor get sufficient advice and deliberation before making this decision legitimate. However, after reviewing findings of the district court about the difficulties that such a requirement would create in families that are dysfunctional and the frequency of such dysfunctionality , the Court declared that there was no rational relationship between the legitimate legislative goal and the means chosen by the legislature to vindicate that goal.
A similar "required degree of connection" or a "nexus" is required between the exactions imposed by a municipality and the negative impact of the proposed development in Takings  Clause cases. 148 This method, used under equal protection, due process, the dormant commerce clause, freedom of speech, free exercise and establishment clause, applies labels that seems imprecise, subjective and talismanic.. The term reason has a rich history in western philosophy. For Aristotle it meant practical wisdom. 149 152 Especially when the justification of an affirmative action plan is an act or pattern of discrimination, often visited against some unknown minority in the past and whose harm is not compensated, but whose harm is now used as a basis for bestowing some unsought windfall benefit upon one whose only relationship to the original act of discrimination is that he or she shares a racial, ethnic or gender similarity with the past victim. Similar arguments are made with respect to the debate about reparations. 153 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (preference for more junior African-Americans over more senior whites in a reduction in force among teachers where the school found the need for minority role models) 154 163 Lemon 164 judges whether means "advance or inhibit religion" or foster "excessive governmental entanglement" with religion. The fact that there are "reasonable and adequate alternatives" to an in-town milk processing requirement invalidates it. 165 "Reasonable alternative avenues of communication" were also important in Renton 166 Under the Camden 167 , non-residents cannot be targeted unless they are "a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed." Limitations on the right to refuse life saving treatments must be "at least reasonably related to [the] promotion and protection" of the terminally ill patient. 168 Often the Court stops the inquiry after this step-if the means used meets the test it is approved; if not, it's invalidated What in the constitution justifies this inquiry? Perhaps it is the natural law formulations that protect us against pointless and arbitrary constraints. An arbitrary constraint is one that is pointless, that does nothing to advance the commonweal. But we are admittedly quite distant from Marbury and the legitimacy of rationality assessment is dubious. 166 Renton, supra 167 Camden, supra 168 Washington v. Glucksberg U.S.
(1997) (validating anti-assisted suicide statute) valued and compared. 169 It resembles rationality, discussed above, in that it identifies and evaluates the governmental interest presented by a statute. However, it then identifies and recognizes the legitimacy of an opposing interest, usually presented by a litigant Ultimately, however, faced with two opposing legitimate interests, the Court must assign values to the identified interests and choose one. 170 . Two examples of the methodology are Penn Central 171 and Kassel 172 . In Penn Central, the interest of the historical commission in preserving buildings of historical or architectural significance is balanced against the investment expectations of the corporate owner of the building housing a railroad station. In Kassel, the interest of the state of Iowa in traffic safety is balanced against the inconvenience and expense to an interstate carrier of reconfiguring its double trailers in Iowa. 173 First of all, there is, like apples and oranges 174 , no common currency for comparison. 175 Second, the governmental interest represented by the problems presented in the cases (historical preservation and traffic safely)is too multifarious and diffuse to be able to be reduced to a factor in a balance, not to mention the difficulties proof of such interests in the process of litigation. Third, is the problem of cumulation. Most often the Court seems to consider the governmental interest generally: not the interest in the Beaux Artes facade of a building in New York City, but the interest of cities in general in historical preservation, or even more generally, in zoning. The other side of the balance is usually articulated specifically: the investment expectations of the owner of the building, focusing upon its particular circumstances and balance sheet, and not the more general interest of investor expectations. 176 The Court has used balancing in a wide variety of cases. Residential picketing requires a balance between rights of free speech and privacy. 177 Eliminating the undesirable secondary effects caused by the presence of an adult movie theater justified zoning them out of residential neighborhoods. 178 Reducing the demand for gambling through an advertizing ban weighed favorably against the casino owner's right to commercial speech.. 179 The state's interest in preserving the two-party system and the integrity of the election process was sufficiently weighty to justify an anti-fusion party statute. 180 The notice and a post-termination hearing were sufficient under the Due Process Clause when balanced against the difficulties and the expense in the SSI disability programs. 181 Assisted suicide statutes require a balance between the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment and the state's interest in preserving life. 182 The legitimate interest of a public figure against defamation must be balanced against the First Amendment interest in fostering robust debate. 183 The President's need for privacy of communications with subordinates must be balanced against the interests of the criminal courts in gaining access to information. 184 A police officer's use of deadly force is justified only in the case of the fleeing felon. 185 Searches of a student's locker requires a balance of a student's right to privacy and the school officials' control of the schools. 186 In deciding that an incriminating statement made without Miranda warnings was admissible to impeach a defendants credibility the Court balanced the needs to convict the guilty against the interests of the Fifth Amendment. 187 This slippery stuff presents the Court with an intellectual task which ultimately can not be performed honestly and thus reduces itself to nothing less than a subjective judgment about importance. Not only is it measuring the unmeasurable, but if it claims to take everything into account the size of the record and the burden on the adjudicative process will expand exponentially. What the Court really seems to be doing is .freely speculating upon the consequences of one rule as compared to another. The state interest-individual interest is a bit unfair to the individual unless the individual interest is generalized and if it is generalized, how much generalizing is enough. In the balancing mode, the Court is simply replicating the job of the legislature. The Constitution is reduced to a factor in the balance:
188 "doctrinally destructive nihilism 189 ," according to Justice Brennan. Much the same could be said about means-ends analysis. It is vague and uncertain and completely divorced form the constitutional value that the Court is supposedly vindicating.
On the other hand, perhaps balancing and rationality assessment is the best we can do. The world is complex and as much as we like doctrinal purity and absolute rights, every constitutional case presents a case of competing interests and courts can do no more than to exercise their powers of practical reason to resolve and accommodate them. 190 But then again what do we do with Korematsu?
D. CONCLUSION
Over the years academic critics have often suggested that the edifice described herein is unprincipled, subjective and opportunistic. The most recent of these critics have belonged to a diffuse school of thought called critical legal studies 192 . Many of theses critics, drawing inspiration from the legal realists and others from Marxism, suggest that judicial decision-making is a political process, similar to the legislative process and judicial opinions are a mere smoke-screen behind which a judge hides his own predilections. The background and education of most judges will dictate their preference for the party whose interest advances the goals of the wealthy. The feminist critics suggest that the framers had no commitment to their interests and thus the Constitution itself is a deeply flawed document and to make matters worse contemporary American values that find expression in Constitutional decisions are infected by the hegemony of patriarchy 193 . Likewise the race critics note that the Constitution as written ratified the institution of slavery and thus the Constitution's concern for minority rights is weak and of very recent vintage 194 . ("Deconstruction is an intellectual sword used against the evils of oppression and hierarchy that are empowered by the unexamined political choices that limit our capacity to envision alternative social arrangements") context between the Framer and the contemporary reader makes any transmission of original intent impossible. Notwithstanding these critics, Marbury was correctly decided and once this assertion is made, the next step is interpretation. The question is how.
